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Abstract 
 
Slovenia belongs to a group of EU member states that have reduced their personal 
income tax burden during the current financial and economic crisis. The latest changes, 
introduced in the personal income tax system during the last two years, have primarily 
reduced the tax burden on low-income taxpayers. However, this was only the last step 
in a series of personal income tax reforms since 2004 that have on average reduced the 
tax burden on all taxpayers. Using an exclusive database of taxpayers and utilising a 
general-equilibrium modelling platform, we assess the consequences of these reforms at 
both the micro and the macro level. From a macroeconomic point of view, the initial 
positive consequences of higher private consumption and welfare are declining over 
time due the increased budget deficit and reduced investment. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis, EU member states have taken different 
approaches to changing the personal income tax (hereinafter: PIT) system. In most 
cases, the PIT burden on low-income individuals is being reduced; some countries have 
the reduced tax bill for all taxpayers, while others have increased PIT for the highest 
income brackets or certain types of income sources. Slovenia is among those countries 
that have recently reduced the PIT burden on low-income individuals. This has been 
done by splitting the general tax allowance into three sizes depending on individual 
income and, as a result, the aggregated amount of PIT has declined1. However, 
irrespective of the recent financial and economic crisis, Slovenia has been already 
experiencing a series of PIT reforms. 
 The first post-independence PIT system from 1991 remained almost unchanged 
until 2004, when a new tax code was passed by parliament, coming into effect in 
January 2005. However, this code was changed in 2005, with the most important new 
element being the introduction of the schedular taxation of interest, dividends and 
capital gains, whereby a single 20% tax rate was introduced for these types of income. 
This code was only used in the fiscal years 2005 and 2006. In January 2007, a 
completely new PIT law came into effect. It retained the schedular taxation of capital 
income, while changing the tax schedule for other (non-capital) income. A major 
change was the replacement of the highest, 50% marginal tax rate with a new one of 
41% (Čok, 2007). In addition, further changes in the tax code simplified the tax 
compliance procedure and costs (Klun, 2009). This law is still in use, even though it has 
been subject to several new amendments – a major one being the split of the general tax 
allowance into three sizes in 2008, depending on individual income, as already 
mentioned. As a direct response to the financial crisis, the general tax allowance for 
taxpayers with the lowest income was further increased in 2009. 
 One can distinguish three broad systems of PIT in Slovenia. The first one was 
effective prior to (and including) 2004, the second one in the 2005–2006 period, and the 
last one from 2007 onwards. The aim of this paper is to assess the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic consequences of these reforms and the distribution of the PIT burden 
under these three systems. We shall attempt to identify the winners and losers of the PIT 
reforms that led from one system to another. For this purpose, the PIT systems active in 
years 2004, 2006 and 2010 were chosen to assess the distribution of the tax burden. 
 In the article, we consider the question of what the individual income would be 
(how much PIT would have been paid) in 2010, had the PIT codes from 2004 and 2006 
not been changed. As the results reveal, on average all taxpayers were better off after 
the reforms, while the relative winners are those with the lowest income. From a 
macroeconomic point of view, a reduction of PIT at the level of individual taxpayers led 
to a decrease in government revenue, with a positive impact on private consumption and 
employment and a negative impact on gross fixed investment. Reduction of the PIT 
                                                 
1 Other PIT changes recently accepted in Slovenia have minor consequences on government revenue and 
include, e.g., an extension of the investment allowance for self-employed individual entrepreneurs, an 
increase in effective taxation of income from agriculture (agriculture subsidies), and special additional 
49% taxation of remuneration of managers and supervision boards in companies receiving government 
aid (valid only in 2010). While the last two brought addition revenue to the budget, they has relatively 
low impact on budget revenue. 
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 burden on low-income individuals made a significant contribution to their subjective 
well-being, regardless of the “happiness paradox” (Slabe-Erker and Lavrač, 2011)2. 
 The outline of the article is as follows. Section 2 includes a brief review of the PIT 
reforms in the EU and outlines the possible routes of development of a personal income 
tax system. Section 3 is devoted to the data employed in our article and the 
methodology implemented in order to answer our research questions. Section 4 
represents the crucial results on income, consumption, tax burden, tax rates, welfare, 
income inequality, and other microeconomic and macroeconomic indicators. Section 5 
offers the main concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Reforming the personal income tax 
 
Personal income can be taxed according to three basic approaches (OECD, 2006; Zee, 
2005): comprehensive income tax, dual income tax, and flat tax. The comprehensive 
income tax system uniformly taxes labour and capital incomes that are reduced by 
deductions according to the same (usually) progressive tax schedule. The dual income 
tax system includes a proportional tax rate on capital income while retaining 
progressive rates on labour income. This solution was developed in Scandinavian 
countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s for technical and political reasons 
(difficulties) connected to the taxation of capital income (Sorensen, 2006) and has been 
subsequently adopted by several countries, including Slovenia (since 2005). In the 
1990s, the flat-tax3 concept dominated most of the income tax reforms in Eastern 
Europe (cf. Ivanova et al., 2005; Moore, 2005), whereas in Western Europe the concept 
has not been implemented in any country (Fuest et al., 2008). In Slovenia the flat-tax 
concept also triggered a lively public discussion six years ago (Government Office for 
Growth, 2005), although it was ultimately not introduced in practice. 
 All three basic PIT approaches can be found in the EU and, as a result, the share of 
PIT in GDP varied (in 2008) from 3% in Bulgaria to 14.2% in Sweden, and even to 
25.3% in Denmark4, while the EU average amounted to 8.1%. The same pattern 
appeared among the top marginal PIT rates. The average top PIT rate in the EU was 
37.5%, but it varied from 10% in Bulgaria and 56.4% in Sweden (EU Commission, 
2010). In general, the new member states reveal below-average top rates, with the 
exception of Slovenia and Hungary (both with a top rate of 41%). The average top 
marginal PIT rate has been steadily decreasing in the EU; from 47.3% in 1995 to 37.1% 
in 2009. However, in 2010 increases in the UK, Greece and Latvia pushed the average 
                                                 
2 Easterlin’s (1974) “happiness paradox” occurs as rapid economic growth has increased material well-
being, but not also quality of life.  
3 The term “flat-tax” in this context means a PIT system with a single, proportional tax rate, which is 
levied on personal income above a set threshold. However, this is not the Hall-Rabushka (1995) flat-tax, 
which is essentially a singular cash-flow tax on corporate income and wages. An interesting tax 
experiment was also implemented in Croatia that adopted in the mid-1990’s a PIT system based on the 
“consumption-based tax” concept (cf. Blažić, 1999), which was later modified to the conventional PIT 
system. 
4 The high share of PIT in GDP for Denmark was a consequence of relatively low social security 
contributions. 
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 top marginal PIT rate to the present value of 37.5% (other countries kept their top PIT 
rates unchanged).5 
 During the recent crisis, many EU member states have introduced changes to their 
PIT system, mostly in the direction of reducing the tax burden. According to a recent 
report by the EU Commission which covers developments up until March 2010, three 
EU member states (Estonia, Greece and Latvia) have introduced changes in their PIT 
system that increase the share of PIT in GDP. Fifteen member states, including 
Slovenia, are reducing the share of PIT in GDP, while for the rest an assessment is not 
made or the PIT changes are revenue-neutral. In Slovenia, the PIT changes made during 
the period of crisis are estimated to reduce PIT as a proportion of GDP by 0.11 
percentage points (EU Commission, 2010). 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
The modelling platform of the Slovenian economy is represented by a dynamic general 
equilibrium model of the Slovenian economy (Bayar et al., 2006; 2011), linked to a 
microsimulation model (Majcen et al., 2007). The resulting modelling framework, 
entitled SloMod, takes into account the structure and all the fundamental mechanisms of 
the Slovenian economy, as well as all the important elements of the structural and tax 
reforms, including the reform of social transfers, government expenditure, and the 
volume and structure of financial flows between the Slovenian and EU budgets. 
 The modelling platform incorporates the economic behaviour of four economic 
agents, i.e. firms, households, government and the foreign sector, which are assumed to 
adopt optimising behaviour under relevant budget constraints, and where all markets 
operate under the perfect competition assumption. Five household income groups are 
distinguished in the model according to income levels. Each quintile group receives a 
share of capital income, labour income and mixed income plus transfers from the 
government (unemployment benefits, pensions, family, social and other transfers), 
transfers from firms and transfers from the EU. 
 Production is disaggregated into 25 branches and in each of them, one or several 
types of 25 different commodities are produced. Five branches are split into market and 
public parts. The production of public branches is exogenously determined through 
government final consumption; employment, salaries, costs of material and services, 
and investment. Substantial rigidity is introduced into the model. 
 Market producers operate in perfectly competitive markets and maximise profits (or 
minimise costs for each level of output) to determine the optimal levels of inputs and 
output. The gross output for each market branch is determined from a nested production 
structure. Labour is differentiated according to education levels into three skill groups; 
unskilled labour, skilled labour and highly skilled labour. Rigidities in the labour market 
are introduced by wage differentials at the branch and skill level, derived as the ratio 
between the wage rate by branch and skill and the average wage rate by skill level. 
 The model accounts for a detailed cost structure at the branch level, including taxes 
on intermediate consumption, labour, capital and a mixed factor. Upon intermediate 
consumption firms receive subsidies from the government, pay excise duties, the non-
deductible part of value-added tax and other taxes on products. Firms pay trade and 
                                                 
5 The top PIT rate does not completely reflect the PIT burden, though, since the latter also depends on the 
number of tax brackets, their width, and the system of tax allowances. 
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 transport margins on intermediate consumption. With regard to labour, the model 
accounts for the social security contributions paid by employees and employers and for 
payroll taxes. Firms pay corporate income tax on their profits. In the derivation of the 
corporate income tax paid by firms, the share of reliefs, losses and extraordinary 
income/expenditure is taken into account. 
 The economy is treated as a small open economy with no influence on (given) 
world market prices. Three main groups of trading partners are distinguished in the 
model; the EU-15, the new EU member states, and the rest of the world. The 
assumption of limited substitution possibilities between domestically produced and 
imported goods is also adopted in the model. It indicates that domestic consumers use 
composite imported and domestically produced goods, according to a CES function. 
 Total government revenues consist of excise duties, value-added tax and other taxes 
on products, personal income taxes and social security contributions paid by employees, 
employers and the self-employed, payroll taxes, corporate income tax, other taxes on 
production and transfers from the EU. Total government expenditures are given by 
subsidies on products and on production, transfers to households, to the EU and to the 
rest of the world, gross capital fixed formation and current consumption. Transfers to 
households include unemployment benefits, pensions, social, family and other transfers 
differentiated by quintile groups and level of education. 
 The assessment of micro effects (at the level of taxpayers) is based on the PIT 
database for 2007 prepared by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 
(SORS), which includes 113,000 individual tax records with all variables required to 
calculate individual PIT (i.e. all types of incomes subject to tax and tax allowances) and 
is a representative sample of the population. To enable a comparison of the results based 
on the PIT systems from 2004 and 2007 with those from 2010, data on income were 
uprated by the growth of the average wage between 2007 and 2010. Using such an 
amended database, we then applied the PIT regulations from 2004, 2007 and 2010. 
 The PIT of each individual from the sample is calculated according to the 
parameters of all three systems and deducted from their gross income to obtain their net 
after-tax income as a final result. To estimate the aggregate amount of PIT at the 
national level, the results were multiplied with a factor corresponding to the ratio 
between the sample size and the population size. All of the calculations are static, i.e. 
they do not take into account any shifts in behaviour that might occur due to changes in 
the tax parameters. The tax parameters from all three systems that were taken into 
account are presented in Table 1. 
 The general tax allowance, which is given to all taxpayers, was increased in the 
2006 system compared with the 2004 system as compensation for abolishing the 
allowance for different purposes, which represented 2% or even 4% of an individual tax 
base. The seniority, invalidity and voluntary pension insurance allowances did not 
change substantially. Self-employed journalists and cultural professionals obtained an 
additional allowance after 2004, while the student work allowance was reduced. In the 
2004 system, a grossing up mechanism was used to calculate the PIT on pensions. It 
was subsequently replaced by a special pensioner allowance (tax credit) with the same 
effect. Both of them meant that only a few pensioners with the highest pensions 
effectively pay PIT. A substantial reduction of standardised costs, which are deducted 
from gross income before tax allowances, were introduced for royalties after 2004, 
while standardised costs for other types of income (contractual work and rents) were not 
changed. Significant changes have been introduced to the tax schedule since 2004 and 
 4
 as a result there are only three tax brackets now, with the highest marginal tax rate of 
41%. The reduction of the highest marginal rate of 50% coincides with the general EU 
trend (EU Commission, 2010; cf. IBFD, 2008). 
 
Table 1: Personal income taxation parameters (in EUR at 2010 prices) 
 
 2004 system 2006 system 2010 system 
Tax allowances (EUR):    
– general 1,968.87 2,856.39 
3,100.17 / 
4,147.67 / 
6,120.00 
– children1 
1) 1,789.88 
2) 2,684.83 
3) 3,579.77 
1) 2,29177 
2) 2,491.08 
3) 3,321.60 
1) 2,287.48 
2) 2,486.78 
3) 4,147.58 
– seniority (for those aged 65+) 1,431.91 1,328.54 1,334.18 
– 100% invalidity 17,898.84 16,608.00 16,575.94 
– invalidity 7,159.54 5,790.96 3,100.17 
– self-employed journalists and 
   cultural professionals – 3,755.63 3,750.00 
– voluntary pension insurance2 2,913.48 2,651.29 2,646.21 
– pensioners grossed up 14.5% 13.5% 
– allowance for different 
   purposes3 3% 2% / 4% – 
– allowance for daily 
   international migrants – – 7,112.00 
Standardised costs (%):    
– contractual work (including 
   student work) 10% 10% 10% 
– royalties 40% 10% 10% 
– rents 40% / 60% 40% 40% 
Tax schedule:    
– number of tax brackets 6 5 3 
– marginal tax rates (%) 17 / 37 / 40 / 45 / 50 16 / 33 / 37 / 41 / 50 16 / 27 / 41 
Indexation of the schedule 
and allowances 
growth of the 
average gross wage 
growth of the retail 
price index 
growth of the retail 
price index 
Schedular taxation of 
capital income No Yes Yes 
 
Notes: (1) In all three years, the tax allowance for any adult dependent family member equals the 
allowance for the first dependent child. (2) In all three years, these tax allowances cannot exceed 5.844% 
of an individual taxpayer’s annual gross wage or exceed the amount mentioned in Table 1. (3) The 
allowance for different purposes is defined as the sum of a taxpayer’s expenses for selected purchases, 
such as the acquisition of books or government securities. It cannot exceed 3% (2% / 4%) of an individual 
taxpayer’s tax base. 
 
Source: Chamber of Accountants, Financials and Auditors of Slovenia (2010); own calculations. 
 
 All parameters in Table 1 are calculated, as mentioned, in 2010 prices using the 
system of upgrading tax parameters (revalorisation) which was in place in a particular 
year. Under the 2004 system, this is growth of the average gross wage. Since 2007 the 
upgrading mechanism is based on growth of the retail price index. The introduction of 
the retail price index also means that the majority of taxpayers are approaching the top 
tax bracket since the growth of wages as the major income source is generally 
exceeding the growth of prices in the long term. Capital income, which is taxed on a 
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 schedular basis (dividends, bank interest, and capital gains), is not taken into account. 
The reason for this is to allow the comparison since in the 2004 system bank interest, as 
a major source of capital income, was not taxed with PIT. Considering this, one should 
be aware that the results, presented in the article, only reflect the taxation of income 
from labour, and only to a certain level is the taxation of capital income taxed according 
to a progressive tax schedule (rents and royalties). Taking into account the PIT 
schedules from all three years and using their methods of valorisation, the PIT 
schedules for all three years (in 2010 prices) are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: PIT schedules (in 2010 values) 
 
2004 system 
 From (EUR) To (EUR) Marginal tax rate 
1 0   8,888.85 17% 
2   8,888.85 17,777.68 35% 
3 17,777.68 26,666.54 37% 
4 26,666,54 35,555.36 40% 
5 35,555.36 53,333.05 45% 
6 53,333.05  50% 
 
2006 system 
 From (EUR) To (EUR) Marginal tax rate 
1 0   6,273.54 16% 
2 6,273.54 12,257.54 33% 
3 12,257.54 24,804.62 37% 
4 24,804.62 49,850.53 41% 
5 49,850.53  50% 
 
2010 system 
 From (EUR) To (EUR) Marginal tax rate 
1 0   7,528.99 16% 
2   7,528.99 15,057.96 27% 
3 15,057.96  41% 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 Table 2 reveals substantial changes in the tax schedules from one system to another. 
If the 2004 system was still in use in 2010, the schedule would have consisted of six tax 
brackets and a taxable income above EUR 53,333.05 would have been taxed with a 50% 
marginal tax rate. In practice, the 2010 tax schedule only consisted of three tax brackets, 
with the highest marginal rate of 41% for taxable income above EUR 15,057.96. 
 As can be inferred, the modelling platform enables both the macro and the micro 
level of analysis, where the former is based primarily on the general equilibrium model 
and the latter rests primarily on the microsimulation model, thus exploiting the 
synergies between the two.6 The model was built within the general algebraic modelling 
system (GAMS) and solved numerically with the PATH algorithm. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Applications include analyses of foreign trade liberalisation and financial flows (Majcen et al., 2005), of 
labour market reforms (Čok et al., 2009), of personal income tax reforms (Majcen et al., 2009), and of 
influence of R&D on economic performance (Verbič et al., 2011). 
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 4. The results 
 
Results on the level of individual taxpayers are presented in Table 3. Taxpayers are 
arranged in decile groups based on paid PIT according to the 2004 system. For each 
decile group the average net (after-tax) income for all three systems is calculated. The 
results reveal different magnitudes of the tax reforms. While the reform of 2004 (the 
2004 system versus the 2006 system) only improved the position of low-income 
individuals (by 2.7% on average in the first three deciles) and reduced the after-tax 
income of the wealthy (by 0.4% on average in the last three deciles), the second reform 
also improved the net income of higher-income individuals. Finally, under the 2010 
system all taxpayers were better off (see last two columns of Table 3). 
 The biggest relative winners of the reforms were obviously individuals from the 
first few decile groups. Namely, the average net income in the first decile group7 
increased by 8.4% between the 2010 system and the 2004 system (by 5.1% between the 
2010 system and the 2006 system) due to the PIT changes, while the average net 
income of the top 10% individual taxpayers increased by 1.0% (by 1.9% between the 
2010 system and the 2006 system). 
 
Table 3: Average net income (in EUR) 
 
Decile 
group 
2004 
system 
2006 
system 
2010 
system 2006/2004 2010/2006 2010/2004 
1   3,865.1   3,985.9   4,189.9   3.1%   5.1%   8.4% 
2   6,067.3   6,223.2   6,609.1   2.6%   6.2%   8.9% 
3   7,236.4   7,404.8   7,678.7   2.3%   3.7%   6.1% 
4   8,357.5   8,501.0   8,626.7   1.7%   1.5%   3.2% 
5   9,545.5   9,579.8   9,735.7   0.4%   1.6%   2.0% 
6 10,736.3 10,751.9 10,956.8   0.1%   1.9%   2.1% 
7 12,155.8 12,178.6 12,458.7   0.2%   2.3%   2.5% 
8 14,048.7 14,045.7 14,455.2   0.0%   2.9%   2.9% 
9 17,008.1 16,952.0 17,453.4 –0.3%   3.0%   2.6% 
10 28,483.7 28,227.7 28,764.2 –0.9%   1.9%   1.0% 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 Table 4 includes average PIT rates8, which reveal an opposite picture compared 
with the changes on net income from Table 3. While the first reform slightly increased 
the tax rate for the top two decile groups (by as little as 0.45 percentage points or 2.1% 
on average), the second reform reversed this effect (the PIT rate decreased by 2.57 
percentage points or 30.5% on average, taking into account all deciles). 
 The final result is an overall reduction of average tax rates, which is especially 
severe at the bottom of income distribution (see Table 4). Namely, the average tax rate 
in the first decile group is 7.31 percentage points or 89.8% lower, while the average PIT 
                                                 
7 Pensioners represent a major share of low-income taxpayers, due to special tax allowance (see Table 1), 
which effectively nullified their tax bill. However, under the 2004 system the amount of PIT paid by the 
retired taxpayers reached 140.3 million EUR, while subsequent reforms reduced this amount to 136.3 
million (2006 system), and further to 105.6 million EUR (2010 system). 
8 Average personal income tax rate is defined as a proportion of PIT to gross income reduced by 
employee’s social security contributions. This definition of average tax rate covers fluctuation in the PIT 
burden that have occurred in reforms through changes in standardised costs, tax allowances, tax schedule 
and indexation (see Table 1). 
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 rate in the first three deciles is 6.93 percentage points or 77.6% lower on average in the 
2010 system compared with the 2004 system. 
 
Table 4: Average personal income tax rates 
 
Decile 
group 
2004 
system 
2006 
system 
2010 
system 2006/2004 2010/2006 2010/2004 
1 0.0814 0.0515 0.0083 –36.7% –83.9% –89.8% 
2 0.0921 0.0690 0.0123 –25.1% –82.2% –86.6% 
3 0.0977 0.0769 0.0427 –21.3% –44.5% –56.3% 
4 0.0989 0.0835 0.0700 –15.6% –16.2% –29.2% 
5 0.1066 0.1031 0.0890   –3.3% –13.7% –16.5% 
6 0.1182 0.1166 0.1005   –1.4% –13.8% –15.0% 
7 0.1279 0.1260 0.1068   –1.5% –15.2% –16.5% 
8 0.1416 0.1415 0.1176   –0.1% –16.9% –16.9% 
9 0.1703 0.1728 0.1486     1.5% –14.0% –12.7% 
10 0.2372 0.2436 0.2314     2.7%   –5.0%   –2.4% 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 As the values of Gini coefficient, squared coefficient of variation (I2) and Atkinson 
index show (Table 5), the reforms also influenced the distribution of net income in the 
society. Income inequality has subsequently been reduced by all PIT codes, though 
more by the first PIT reform than by the second one. Namely, the Gini coefficient 
decreased by 2.0% after the first reform and by only 1.1% after the second one, the 
squared coefficient of variation decreased by 3.7% after the first reform and by only 
1.3% after the second one, while the Atkinson index decreased by 4.1% after the first 
reform and by only 2.8% after the second one. Additionally, we have to take into 
account that the duration of the first reform was much shorter than of the second one. 
 The final result is then an overall reduction of the inequality measures. Namely, the 
Gini coefficient decreased by 3.0%, the squared coefficient of variation decreased by 
4.9%, while the Atkinson index decreased by as much as 6.8% in the 2010 system 
compared with the 2004 system (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Inequality measures 
 
Inequality 
measure 
2004 
system 
2006 
system 
2010 
system 2006/2004 2010/2006 2010/2004 
Gini 0.3004 0.2944 0.2913 –2.0% –1.1% –3.0% 
I2 0.4487 0.4321 0.4265 –3.7% –1.3% –4.9% 
Atkinson (ε = 2) 0.2761 0.2647 0.2573 –4.1% –2.8% –6.8% 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 The lower amount of PIT collected at the taxpayer level represented a decrease in 
government revenues (Table 6). Government revenues were thus EUR 327.9 million 
(14.4% in absolute terms or 0.9 percentage points of GDP) lower under the 2010 system 
than they would have been if the 2004 system was still in use. The majority of this 
decrease occurred with the second PIT reform (13.1% in absolute terms or 0.8 
percentage points of GDP). Consequently, the internationally already low PIT-to-GDP 
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 ratio (5.7% in Slovenia compared to a weighted average of 9.0% in the EU-27 in 2004; 
cf. EU Commission, 2010) has been further reduced. 
 
Table 6: Aggregate amount of PIT in absolute and relative terms 
 
 2004 system 
2006 
system 
2010 
system 2006/2004 2010/2006 2010/2004 
Amount of PIT 2,283.9 2,250.8 1,956.0 –1.4% –13.1% –14.4% 
% of GDP 6.4% 6.3% 5.5% –0.1pp –0.8pp –0.9pp 
 
Notes: Aggregate amount of PIT (first line) is in EUR million at 2010 prices, thus the corresponding 
changes are in percentages. Aggregate amount of PIT is then expressed as percentage of 2010 GDP 
(second line), thus the corresponding changes are in percentage points (pp). 
 
Source: IMAD (2010); own calculations. 
 
 The long-term macroeconomic consequences are presented in Tables 7 and 8. The 
year 2004 is used as the reference for comparison (base year of the general equilibrium 
model) and we therefore prepared a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, in which we 
assume that the personal income tax system from 2004 is valid throughout the complete 
simulation period. In the second step, two scenarios (simulations) with the PIT system 
in 2006 and 2010 were performed. 
 As can be seen from Table 7, introduction of the 2006 system did not lead to 
substantial changes at the macro level. The changes in real GDP, exports, imports and 
employment were negligible compared to the BAU scenario, while there was some 
change in private consumption (0.3%) and grossed fixed investment (–0.5%). In 
contrast, introduction of the 2010 system caused some tangible effects. Namely, real 
GDP increased by 0.3% compared to the BAU scenario, household private consumption 
increased by 1.5%, while the gross fixed investment decreased by 2.1%. 
 
Table 7: Macroeconomic effects of different personal income tax systems (percentage 
change compared to the BAU scenario) 
 
 2006 system 2010 system 
Gross domestic product   0.0   0.3 
Private consumption   0.3   1.5 
Gross fixed investment –0.5 –2.1 
Exports   0.0   0.1 
Imports   0.0   0.1 
Employment   0.0   0.2 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 The lower personal income tax burden therefore increased the disposable income of 
households and their private consumption. Conversely, it reduced the government tax 
revenue, which led (based on the assumption of unchanged government expenditure) to 
a government deficit, and consequently to increased interest payments and debt. All of 
these elements had a negative impact on gross fixed investment, which in the long term 
eliminated the positive effect on GDP growth. 
 Table 8 shows the macroeconomic consequences at the household level. For this 
purpose, households were arranged in quintile groups by disposable income. The results 
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 again reveal9 that households with lower income gained more, in terms of both real 
consumption and welfare10. Namely, real consumption of first two quintiles increased 
on average by 0.7% under the 2006 system and by 1.8% under the 2010 system, while 
welfare of first two quintiles increased on average by 0.5 percentage points under the 
2006 system and by 1.3 percentage points under the 2010 system, all compared to the 
BAU scenario. Conversely, real consumption of last two quintiles increased on average 
by 0.2% under the 2006 system and by 1.4% under the 2010 system, while welfare of 
first two quintiles increased on average by 0.1 percentage points under the 2006 system 
and by 0.9 percentage points under the 2010 system, again compared to the BAU 
scenario. Real saving increased even more on average; by 0.9% under the 2006 system 
and by 3.6% under the 2010 system (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Macroeconomic effects on households’ quintile levels (change compared to the 
BAU scenario) 
 
Quintile 
group 
Real consumption Real saving Welfare gain/loss (% of household income) 
2006 system 2010 system 2006 system 2010 system 2006 system 2010 system 
1   0.7% 1.8%   1.5% 4.3%   0.5pp 1.3pp 
2   0.6% 1.8%   1.3% 4.0%   0.4pp 1.2pp 
3   0.6% 1.8%   1.1% 3.8%   0.4pp 1.2pp 
4   0.4% 1.6%   0.8% 3.4%   0.3pp 1.0pp 
5 –0.1% 1.2% –0.1% 2.6% –0.1pp 0.7pp 
 
Note: The effects on real consumption and real saving are given in percentages, while the effects on 
welfare are presented in percentage points (pp), all compared to the BAU scenario. 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 Additionally, under the 2010 system households in all quintile groups were better 
off compared with the 2004 system, compared to the 2006 system, where the results for 
the fifth quintile group suggest a negative outcome (see Tables 3 and 8). However, with 
respect to the latter finding, one should be aware of the fact that we did not take into 
account the introduction of schedular taxation of interest, dividends and capital gains 
with a single 20% tax rate – a change that has positive effects primarily on disposable 
income of the higher-income individuals and households. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this article, we studied the influence of PIT reforms in Slovenia since 2004, including 
the latest changes that were a consequence of the current financial and economic crisis. 
While the PIT reform of 2004 reduced the tax burden of low-income individuals and 
increased it for the wealthy, the second reform of 2007 reduced the tax burden of all 
                                                 
9 Macroeconomic effects on households’ income should be interpreted together with the distribution of 
average net income in Table 3 and the distribution of PIT rates in Table 4. 
10 Welfare is examined by equivalent variation in income, which measures the income needed to make the 
household as well off as in the new-scenario equilibrium evaluated at benchmark prices. The equivalent 
variation is positive for welfare gains from the policy scenario and negative for losses (cf. Harrison and 
Kriström, 1999; Verbič, 2007). 
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 taxpayers. Namely, an important part of this reform was an additional increase in the 
general tax allowance for low-income taxpayers in 2008 and a further one in 2009. With 
this solution, Slovenia adopted an approach similar to those in many EU member states 
that reduced the PIT burden of most vulnerable members of the society. 
 Regarding the Slovenian government budget, the reform represented a substantial 
decrease in government revenue, assessed at some 0.9% of GDP compared to the “pre-
reform” year 2004. From a macroeconomic point of view, the reduced PIT burden 
initially increased household disposable income, private consumption and welfare. 
However, in the long term these positive effects are diminished through a negative 
impact on the government deficit and gross fixed investments. 
 From the policy point of view, one should take the static nature of our results into 
account as they do not include any shifts in behaviour that might occur due to changes 
in the tax system. In addition, the results do not include part of capital income, the 
taxation of which has been transferred from the progressive schedule to the proportional 
20% regime. However, the results do capture the bulk of income subject to tax and, 
since they are based on a representative sample of the population, they enable a clear 
insight into PIT policy trends over the last decade in Slovenia, which are in line with 
trends in (most) other EU member states. 
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